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“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
2

Bashe Abdi Yousuf was a young Somali businessman who had just
started UFFO,3 an organization that sought to improve the conditions in a
local hospital, when he was subject to the “Mig.”4 On or around
1
Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of
German Major War Criminals, The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).
2
Courts and news sources use ‘Yousef,’ ‘Yousuf,’ and ‘Youseff’ interchangeably.
For consistency, this comment will refer to the plaintiff in the case as ‘Yousuf.’
3
UFFO, literally meaning “the wind behind the storm,” was founded in 1983 as a
self-help organization comprised of local Somaliland intellectuals based in Hargeisa,
Somalia. “In the eyes of UFFO, the government was not properly fulfilling its role as a
provider of basic social services. The organization wanted to make a statement and
undertook to rehabilitate the hospital of Hargeisa, without government participation or
approval.” Marleen Renders, Turbans and Tribes: The Building of a State and the
Political Role of Islam in Somaliland, in 489 L’ISLAM POLITIQUE AU SUD DU SAHARA –
IDENTITÉS, DISCOURS ET ENJEUX (Muriel Gomez Perez ed., 2005).
4
Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 04–1360, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *7 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 1, 2007), rev’d, Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78
U.S.L.W. 3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08–1555). See also William Branigin, Somali
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November 19, 1981, Somali National Security Service (“NSS”) agents5
barged into Yousuf’s warehouse in Hargesia, Somalia and forced him
into a Land Cruiser.6 The guards took Yousuf to a detention center
where interrogators forced him down to the ground, tightly tied his hands
and feet together with rope so that his body was arched backwards in a
slightly-tilted “U” shape, with his arms and legs in the air, and then
placed a rock on his back, causing him excruciating pain.7 They then
tightened the rope causing deep cuts to his arms and legs.8 The
interrogators were subjecting Yousuf to the “Mig”—a torture method
that placed the prisoner’s body in a shape that resembled the Somali Air
Force’s MIG aircraft.9 Yousuf’s interrogators questioned him about his
activities with UFFO and threatened to continue the torture unless he
confessed to anti-government activities in connection with his work at
the organization.10 During his three-month detention, Yousuf suffered
through eight water-boarding sessions and twice endured electric shocks
to his armpits.11 He was eventually brought before the National Security
Court, a special military court with jurisdiction over civilians accused of
national security crimes and political offenses.12 Although he pleaded
not guilty, Yousuf was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment and
spent six years in solitary confinement in near to total darkness in a sixby-six foot cell.13
Expatriates Charged with War Crimes – Two Men Accused Now Live in Northern
Virginia, WASH. POST, November 11, 2004.
5
The district court opinion presents Yousuf’s account of the political scenario in
Somalia at the time of Yousuf’s detention and subsequent torture. The court recounts
that, [I]n October 1969, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre led a coup that set up an
authoritarian socialist rule in Somalia . . . .[P]ower was assumed by the Supreme
Revolutionary Council (“SRC”), which consisted primarily of the Army officers who had
supported and participated in the coup, including Samantar. The SRC suspended the
existing Constitution, closed the National Assembly, abolished the Supreme Court and
declared all groups not sponsored by the government . . . to be illegal. . . . Beginning in
the early 1980s, the military committed numerous atrocities against ordinary citizens in
an attempt deter the growing opposition movements. Security forces . . . were together
responsible for the widespread and systematic use of torture, arbitrary detention, and
extrajudicial killing against the civilian population of Somalia. Samantar, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56227, at *2–3, *7. See also Brenda Sandburg, Exporting Justice, THE RECORDER,
Apr. 18, 2005.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

*18.

Samantar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *10.
Id.
Id. at *11 n.6.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id.
Id. Yousuf eventually fled Somalia, and currently resides in Virginia, USA. Id.
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In 2004, seven members14 of the Isaaq clan,15 including Yousuf,
filed suit against Mohamed Ali Samantar in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.16 At various intervals between 1980 and
1990, Samantar served in positions of high authority in the Somali
military-led government, including as First Vice President and Minister
of Defense, and Prime Minister.17 Plaintiffs18 sued under the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”),19 and the Alien Tort Claims
Act (“ATCA”).20 Plaintiffs alleged that Samantar, in his official capacity
as Minister of Defense and later as Prime Minister, knew or should have
known that his subordinates were engaged in conduct that amounted to
gross human rights abuses such as torture, extrajudicial killings, cruel
and inhuman treatment, and arbitrary detentions.21 Samantar argued that
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims
pursuant to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (“FSIA”).22 The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ suit, holding that
14
There were seven plaintiffs in total, only two of which are named, the rest
“remaining anonymous fearing reprisals if identified.” See Branigin, supra note 5.
15
The district court noted that “[e]ven before Somalia became an independent nation,
the clan system served as the fundamental building block of Somali society and attracted
great emotional allegiance.” Samantar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *3 n.3. The
post-coup military leadership favored its own clans, and oppressed the others through
systematically building upon and exploiting the clan system. Id. This was achieved by
“appointing members of favored clans to top governmental and military positions while
also oppressing and targeting other clans, especially the Isaaq clan in the northern
regions.” Id. The District Court noted that “[m]embers of the Isaaq clan, located
primarily in the northwestern region of Somalia, were a special target of the government
because they were among the best educated and most prosperous Somalis, and therefore
perceived as potential opponents to the Barre regime.” Id. at *3.
16
Id. at *1.
17
Id. at *18.
18
The Fourth Circuit summarized the circumstances under which each plaintiff
alleged that he or she suffered atrocities based on affiliation with the Isaaq clan: “Plaintiff
Jane Doe [alleges that] she was abducted from her family home in Hargeisa by NSS
agents, repeatedly tortured and raped, beaten to the point that she could not walk, and
placed in solitary confinement for three and a half years . . . . [P]laintiff John Doe II
[alleges that] although he was a non-commissioned officer in the Somali National Army,
he was arrested . . . and then shot during a mass execution. Doe survived his non-fatal
wound by hiding under a pile of bodies . . . . Plaintiff Aziz Mohamed Deria alleges that
his father and brother were tortured and killed by soldiers . . . . Plaintiff John Doe I . . .
asserts that his two brothers were abducted by government forces while tending the
family’s livestock and then executed.” Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 374 (4th Cir.
2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009)(No. 08–1555).
19
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010).
20
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010).
21
Samantar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *19–20.
22
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2010) (“[A] foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”).
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Samantar acted in his official capacity upon the directives of the Somali
government and not for “personal reasons or motivation.”23 The FSIA
provided Samantar with immunity from suit based on those actions. The
district court found that permitting such a suit against a foreign
government official would amount to an abrogation of foreign sovereign
immunity and would permit litigants to achieve “indirectly what the Act
barred them from doing directly.”24 Plaintiffs appealed.
In a decision shattering precedent set by other circuits, and
distinguishing precedent set by itself, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court’s opinion and found the FSIA inapplicable to Samantar on
the grounds that sovereign immunity is only available to a foreign
official continuing to be an “agency or instrumentality” of the foreign
state.25 According to the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the linguistic
construction of the FSIA, since Samantar was no longer an official of the
state, immunity was not available to him under the FSIA.26 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit effectively removed the hurdle of the FSIA to most torture
suits against former government officials. As Judge Duncan noted in his
concurring opinion, the result of the Fourth Circuit’s decision was that
future defendants would have to rely on “common law immunities that
predate the FSIA” such as act of state immunity and head of state
immunity.27 Samantar filed a petition with the Supreme Court, which
has interpreted the text of several provisions in the FSIA in recent
years.28 While it has long been the rule that the FSIA protects foreign
governments from suit in United States courts, the Supreme Court has
never addressed whether the FSIA also affords immunity to foreign
government officials.
The circuits have split on the issue of whether the FSIA is a source
of immunity from suit in the United States for individual foreign officials
like Samantar.29 The Seventh Circuit reversed precedent when it held
23

Samantar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *44.
Id.
25
Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 383 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W.
3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08–1555).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 384. (Duncan, J., concurring).
28
See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S.Ct. 2183 (2009) (interpreting the
terrorism exception to immunity); Permanent Mission of India to the U.N. v. City of New
York, 551 U.S. 193 (2007) (interpreting the property exception to immunity); Republic of
Aus. v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (regarding retroactivity); Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003) (interpreting the meaning of “instrumentalities of a
foreign state”).
29
See RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12898, at *19 n. 8
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2009) (noting the split in the circuits). Compare In Re Terrorist
Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2008), Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig.,
277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002), Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho
24
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that the FSIA did not grant immunity in an ATCA suit against former
Nigerian President, General Abdusalami Abubakar.30 Prior to the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Abubakar, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and
District of Columbia circuits each held that the FSIA was a source of
immunity for an individual foreign official.31 Three years after
Abubakar, the Second Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation and sided with the majority opinion in the circuits.32 The
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Samantar complicates FSIA jurisprudence
and leaves the question of redress under the TVPA and ATCA unclear.
Future litigants—especially victims of torture—are left without a clear
path to redress; although Congress specifically provided for
accountability for torture victims through its passage of the TVPA,
majority circuit precedent suggests that individual foreign officials
responsible for the acts of torture are free from suit pursuant to the
FSIA.33
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Samantar.34
Commentators see the case as a “litigation litmus test” for the current
administration’s commitment to human rights.35 The Supreme Court
must answer two questions: first, whether a foreign state’s immunity
from suit under the FSIA extends to an individual acting in his official
capacity on behalf of a foreign state, and second, whether an individual
who is no longer an official at the time suit is filed retains immunity for
acts taken in the individual’s former capacity as an official acting on

S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999), Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al
Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank,
912 F.2d 1095, 1101–03 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that FSIA immunity extends to
individual governmental officials for acts taken in their official capacity), with Enahoro v.
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005), and Samantar, 552 F.3d at 374. (holding
that it does not).
30
Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882. The complaint included claims for “torture; arbitrary
detention; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; false imprisonment; assault and
battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and wrongful death.” Id. at 880.
31
See supra note 30 for a list of cases.
32
Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 81.
33
In Re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2008), Keller v.
Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002), Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y
Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999), Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan
Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and Chuidian v.
Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101–03 (9th Cir. 1990).
34
Yousuf v. Samantar, 78 U.S.L.W. 3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08–1555).
35
John B. Bellinger, Litigation Litmus Test, WASH. TIMES, Monday Jan. 18, 2010
(“[T]he [current] administration has a dilemma: If the Supreme Court concludes that
former foreign government officials are subject to civil suits in the United States, it could
open the door to human rights litigation against foreign government officials in the U.S.
and complicate the administration’s diplomatic initiatives.”).
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behalf of the foreign state.36 This note suggests that the Supreme Court
should preserve the private right of action in the TVPA by holding that
the FSIA does not grant blanket immunity to current or former foreign
officials for official or unofficial acts that violate jus cogens norms.37
This suggestion is made on two grounds. First, when the official acts of
current or former individual foreign official violate jus cogens norms,
immunity granted to foreign states in the FSIA does not extend to current
or former individual foreign officials.38 This is because under the
normative hierarchy theory, a state’s jurisdictional immunity is abrogated
when the state violates human rights protections that are considered
peremptory international norms, known as jus cogens.39 Second, as
reflected in both the legislative history and judicial interpretation of the
TVPA, Congress intended that former and current officials would not be
immune from suit for acts of torture.
Part II chronicles the development of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and its ultimate codification by Congress in the FSIA, and
examines the provisions of the FSIA applicable to the debate at hand.
Part III addresses the current circuit split before the Court in Samantar.
Part IV discusses the legislative history surrounding the passage of the
TVPA and ATCA, and their relationship with the FSIA. Specifically,
Part IV will discuss triggering the FSIA in cases where foreign officials
are sued under the ATCA and TVPA. Part V provides reasons why the
Supreme Court should hold that the FSIA does not grant blanket
immunity to former and current foreign officials in suits brought in
United States courts.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND
ITS CODIFICATION BY THE FSIA
The Supreme Court has said that the FSIA is the “sole basis” for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in an action filed in a U.S.

36

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 08–1555 (June 18, 2009).
A jus cogens (Latin for “compelling law”) norm is a preemptory norm that is a
fundamental principle of international law as a norm from which no derogation is ever
permitted.
38
The note does not address all violations of jus cogens norms, but rather focuses on
torture and the private right of action granted to victims and their survivors in the TVPA.
39
For an exhaustive discussion of normative hierarchy theory, see Lee M. Caplan,
State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy
Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741(2003). Caplan summarizes the theory as follows:
[Normative hierarchy theory] postulates that because state immunity is not jus cogens, it
ranks lower in the hierarchy of international law norms, and therefore can be overcome
when a jus cogens norm is at stake. [The theory] thus seeks to remove one of the most
formidable obstacles in the path of human rights victims seeking legal redress.
37
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court.40 The vague state of nineteenth century foreign sovereign
immunity jurisprudence and the complicated and often conflicting
procedures for seeking sovereign immunity in the twentieth century
preceded Congress’s passage of the FSIA in 1976.41 This history is
crucial in understanding Congress’s intention that the FSIA be the “sole
basis” for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state against the landscape
of the common law regarding foreign sovereign immunity for individuals
prior to its enactment.42
A. Nineteenth Century Origins of the Concept of Sovereign Immunity in
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon
When Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(“FSIA”) in 1976, the concept of foreign sovereign immunity in
American jurisprudence was not a new one. As early as 1812, and in
cases involving subjects as diverse as Napoleonic maritime vessels,
Italian olive oil, the Venezuelan civil war, and Cuban sugar
transportation, the Supreme Court had expressed its opinion on foreign
sovereign immunity. In 1812, in The Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall
wrote that while, within its own territory, a nation enjoys “exclusive and
absolute” jurisdiction that is “susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself,” the United States had impliedly waived jurisdiction over certain
activities of foreign states.43 Widely regarded as the first definitive
statement on the doctrine of foreign state immunity,44 The Exchange
involved a question of jurisdiction over a French ship in the service of
Napoleon that had sailed into an American port.45 According to the
Chief Justice, the “distinct sovereignties” of the world possessed “equal
rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by
intercourse with each other.”46 States therefore impliedly consent to
waive jurisdiction over other foreign sovereigns, and in exchange derive
the benefit of a continued good relationship, in commerce or otherwise,
with one another. The Chief Justice explained his position:
40

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
See infra notes 93 to 97.
42
See, e.g., Justice Duncan’s observation in Samantar that “[t]he [State Department]
has argued in analogous cases that the common law immunities that predate the FSIA
remain the appropriate body of law under which courts should consider the sovereign
immunity of individuals.” 552 F.3d at 384 (Duncan, J., concurring).
43
The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
44
However, the sovereign immunity doctrine originated in the period of monarchal
rule in Europe, and therefore pre-dates The Exchange. See CHARLES LEWIS, STATE AND
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 11 (1980).
45
The Exchange, 11 U.S. at 116.
46
Id. at 136.
41
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One sovereign . . . being bound by obligations of the
highest character not to degrade the dignity of his
nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to
enter a foreign territory . . . in the confidence that the
immunities belonging to his independent sovereign
station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved
by implication, and will be extended to him.47

The Chief Justice extended this rationale to consider the immunity
of representatives of the foreign state and foreign ministers.48 It was his
understanding that if foreign sovereigns were not assured that their
representatives and ministers would be exempt from jurisdiction, “every
sovereign would hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister
abroad.”49 That minister, in turn, would “would owe temporary and local
allegiance to a foreign prince, and would be less competent to the objects
of his mission.”50 Therefore, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that a
sovereign who “[commits] the interests of his nation with a foreign
power, to the care of a person whom he has selected for that purpose,”
should be assured that his minister would be afforded immunity from
suit.51 Despite the narrow facts in The Exchange, the opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall “came to be regarded as extending virtually absolute
immunity to foreign sovereigns.”52 Under this theory, the foreign
sovereign would be afforded the same immunity from suit that the
domestic sovereign enjoyed.53
In 1897, Underhill v. Hernandez directly presented the Supreme
Court with the question of whether foreign sovereign immunity would
apply to a foreign official.54 In Underhill, a U.S. citizen sued a
Venezuelan general for wrong committed against him during the civil
The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit’s
war.55
47

Id. at 137.
Id. at 139. The Chief Justice wrote, “[w]hatever may be the principle on which this
immunity is established, whether we consider him as in the place of the sovereign he
represents, or by a political fiction suppose him to be extra-territorial . . . still the
immunity itself is granted by the governing power of the nation to which the minister is
deputed.” Id at 138.
49
Id. at 139.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Verlinden v. B.V. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
53
For a discussion of the European and American historical underpinnings of the
“absolute immunity” doctrine, including further discussion of The Exchange, see Robert
B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 34 nn. 3–7 (1978).
54
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
55
Id.
48
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determination “that the acts of the defendant were the acts of Venezuela,
and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of
another government.”56 Cases such as The Exchange and Underhill
made it clear that the grant of foreign sovereign immunity was an
exercise in “grace and comity,” and not a restriction imposed by the
United States Constitution.57
B. The Supreme Court’s Move From Absolute Immunity to Restrictive
Immunity in the Twentieth Century.
By the early twentieth century, restrictive immunity replaced
absolute immunity because of the “increasing respect in civilized states
for the rule of law,” and the “[i]ncreasingly large involvement of states in
commercial and trading activities.”58 Although the absolute immunity
principle had already been challenged in the courts of Europe,59 the
Supreme Court’s articulation of the “absolute immunity” principle in The
Exchange remained largely unchallenged until 1921, when the Supreme
Court heard a case on direct appeal from the Southern District of New
York.60 The case involved The Pesaro, an Italian government-owned
vessel carrying olive oil for delivery to American customers.61 The
cargo had been destroyed en route, and the recipients sued.62 The
Southern District of New York had ruled that the restrictive theory of
immunity applied at least in admiralty cases where the government had
become a trading partner with a private party.63 Therefore, the vessel
was not immune from suit in the United States.64 Largely relying on The
Exchange, the Court reversed Judge Mack’s decision, holding that the
absolute immunity theory still stood, and The Pesaro was immune from
suit in the United States.65

56

Id.
See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486 expressing this view.
58
Von Mehren, supra note 54, at 36 (internal citations omitted).
59
Id. at 36 nn. 13–14.
60
The Pesaro, 277 F. 473 (1921).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 476. (“So it may be said here that the Italian government, by giving to the
Pesaro the capacity to
be sued in the Italian courts, voluntarily strips the Pesaro of its sovereign character and
waives all privileges of that character; and that therefore the Pesaro is not exempt from
suit in the United States, by reason of its governmental ownership and operation. For if a
libel can be maintained against the steamship Pesaro in the courts of Italy, it is difficult
to see why our tribunals should decline jurisdiction. . . .”)
64
Id. at 483.
65
Id. at 483.
57
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In the period between the initial articulation of this principle in The
Exchange and The Pesaro, and the passage of the FSIA in 1976, the
courts moved away from judicial determination on the question of
sovereign immunity; the Executive Branch essentially controlled the
grant of foreign sovereign immunity.66 A foreign state faced with suit in
the United States would apply to the State Department for a finding of
immunity.67 Once the State Department made a determination, it would
convey the finding to the relevant court by filing a “suggestion.”68
However, courts treated these “suggestions” as binding determinations
and invoked or denied immunity based upon the State Department’s
decision.69
By the mid-1940s, the Supreme Court’s opinions in Ex Parte
Republic of Peru70 and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,71 made clear that
the Court’s position on sovereign immunity was two-fold: first, the
United States would retain the absolute immunity theory, and second, the
courts would defer to the executive branch for sovereign immunity
determinations.72 Ex Parte Republic of Peru presents a glimpse into the
“accepted course of procedure” a foreign sovereign would undertake to
request a determination of immunity from the State Department.73 In
66
See Verlinden v. B.V. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (“Until 1952,
the State Department ordinarily requested immunity in all actions against friendly foreign
sovereigns.”). See also In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 81-82
(2d Cir. 2008).
67
Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). In the case, the Cuban corporation
filed suit against the Ucayali for its failure to carry sugar from Peru to New York, as per
the terms of an existing contract. Id. at 580. After suit was filed, the Peruvian government
intervened, stating that it was the sole owner of the vessel and that it wished to raise the
defense of sovereign immunity. Id.
71
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
72
See Republic of Aus. v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004). See also Robert B.
von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 33, 41 (1978).
73
Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. at 581. The court details the course of
procedure undertaken by the Government of Peru to secure a determination from the
State Department that it was entitled to sovereign immunity: [The Government of Peru] .
. . asked that the [State] Department advise the Attorney General of the claim of
immunity and that the Attorney General instruct the United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of Louisiana to file in the district court the appropriate suggestion of
immunity. . . .These negotiations resulted in formal recognition by the State Department
of the claim of immunity. This was communicated to the Attorney General by the Under
Secretary’s letter [which] requested him to instruct the United States Attorney to present
to the district court a copy of the Ambassador’s formal claim of immunity filed with the
State Department, and to say that ‘this Department accepts as true the statements of the
Ambassador concerning the steamship Ucayali, and recognizes and allows the claim of
immunity.’ Id.
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stating the rationale for deferring to the Executive branch, Chief Justice
Stone reasoned that it would better serve the national interest if wrongs
allegedly committed by a foreign power were “righted through
diplomatic negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial
proceedings.”74 Therefore, as in Ex Parte Republic of Peru, once the
executive had determined immunity was warranted, it was the court’s
“duty” to submit the issue to the executive for a determination of relief
attainable through diplomatic negotiations.75
Two years later, in Hoffman, the Court took its deference to the
executive branch one step further when it stated that even in the absence
of a State Department determination on the issue of immunity, it would
“inquire whether the ground of immunity is one which is the established
policy of the department to recognize.”76 In Hoffman, the State
Department did not issue a suggestion either way, but rather, pointed to a
case where a vessel was found to be in the possession and control of a
foreign government, and one where it was not.77 The Court interpreted
the State Department’s silence to be controlling.78 Further, the Court
intimated that the determination of foreign sovereign immunity had
implications in the sphere of foreign affairs, and therefore had the
potential to embarrass the United States.79
Therefore, it was
constitutionally appropriate for the Court in Ex parte Republic of Peru
and Mexico v. Hoffman to defer to the executive branch on an issue of
foreign affairs.80

74
Id. at 589. The Chief Justice further noted that “. . . courts may not . . . exercise
their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the Government in conducting
foreign relations . . . . In such cases, the justice department of this government follows the
action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
75
Id. at 588–89. The court noted that the courts must accept a certification and
declaration of immunity as a “conclusive determination by the political arm of the
Government” that continuing the suit in the courts would interfere with the proper
conduct of foreign relations. Id. at 589. See also Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34.
76
Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36.
77
Id. at 31–32.
78
Id. at 34–35. The court reasoned that it was “not for the courts to deny an
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize. . . .” Id. at 35–36 (internal
citations omitted).
79
Id.
80
See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (delineating provisions of executive
power, including the power to appoint and to receive ambassadors and consuls); see also
Verlindin, 461 U.S. at 486 (“[F]oreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and
comity . . . not a restriction imposed by the Constitution. Accordingly, this Court
consistently has deferred to the decisions of the political branches – in particular, those of
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C. The State Department Changes its Policy Towards Foreign Sovereign
Immunity by Issuing the Tate Letter
The State Department continued its policy of requesting that courts
grant immunity to friendly foreign states until 1952 when it issued the
so-called Tate Letter.81 The Tate Letter’s issuance articulated a shift
from a theory of absolute foreign sovereign immunity to one of
restrictive immunity.82 As the Tate Letter articulates,
According to the classical or absolute theory of
sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot, without his
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or
public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with
respect to private acts (jure gestionis). . . . [I]t will
hereafter be the Department’s policy to follow the
restrictive theory . . . in the consideration of requests
of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign
immunity.83

Therefore, while the State Department’s policy prior to the Tate
Letter amounted to immunity in all actions involving friendly foreign
sovereigns, the newer restrictive immunity policy meant that a court
would not grant immunity to a foreign sovereign in suits arising out of
private or commercial activity.84
The Tate Letter changed the

the Executive Branch – on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign
sovereigns and their instrumentalities.”)
81
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 Dep’t. St. Bull.
984, 984–85 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter] cited in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711, 714 (1976); See also Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689–90 (“In
[1952], the State Department concluded that immunity should no longer be granted in
certain types of cases. [The Tate Letter] explained that the Department would thereafter
apply the ‘restrictive theory’ of sovereign immunity . . . .” (internal quotations and
citations omitted)).
82
Tate Letter.
83
Tate Letter, as quoted in Altmann, 541 U.S. at 690.
84
Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Solicitor General,
Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S.
682 at 707 [hereinafter Leigh Letter] (“[S]ince 1952, the Department of State has adhered
to the position that the commercial and private activities of foreign states do not give rise
to sovereign immunity. Implicit in this position is a determination that adjudications of
commercial liability against foreign states do not impede the conduct of foreign relations,
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substantive nature of foreign sovereign immunities law in the United
States.85 The principles of the restrictive approach were collected in the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 65 et. seq. (1965).86
However, the Tate Letter had little impact on the federal courts’
procedural approach to immunity analysis; the State Department
continued to issue statements regarding immunity, and federal courts
continued to abide by them.87 As the Supreme Court explained, foreign
nations placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department when
seeking immunity.88 This occasionally led to suggestions of immunity
even in situations where immunity would have been unavailable under
the restrictive theory.89 In an additional complication, where foreign
nations did not make requests for immunity to the State Department, the
courts had the responsibility to determine whether sovereign immunity
existed.90 Therefore, because “sovereign immunity determinations were
made in two different branches, subject to a variety of facts, sometimes
including diplomatic considerations,” it was not surprising that “the
governing standards were neither clear nor uniformly applied.”91
D. Congress Speaks: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In 1976, Congress passed the FSIA92 to “free the government from
the case-by-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing
standards,”93 and to assure litigants that “decisions are made on purely
legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process.”94 The
purpose of the FSIA was the codification of the large body of common

and that such adjudications are consistent with international law on sovereign
immunity.”)
85
See Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703 (“It is fair to say that the ‘restrictive theory’ of
sovereign immunity appears to be generally accepted as the prevailing law in [the United
States].”).
86
See Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th. Cir. 1990) (citing
sections from the restatement).
87
Verlinden v. B.V. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983). See also
Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100 (“[C]ourts treated such ‘suggestions’ as binding
determinations, and would invoke or deny immunity based upon the decision of the State
Department.”)
88
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 487.
91
Id.
92
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1604 (2006).
93
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
94
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6604, 6605–
06 (“At present, there are no comprehensive provisions in our law available to inform
parties when they can have recourse to the courts to assert a legal claim against a foreign
state.”). See also Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
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law, and in particular, the development of the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity.95 It is also possible that Congress did not want
United States law to deviate from the existing state of international
foreign sovereign immunity law.96
The FSIA establishes a “comprehensive framework” for
determining whether a United States court may exercise jurisdiction over
a foreign state.97 It grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits against
foreign sovereigns even where the parties are not diverse, and the
underlying claims do not present a federal question.98 Importantly, the
FSIA provides the “sole basis” for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign in the United States.99 Under the statute, a foreign state is
presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts.100
The FSIA provides that “a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 – 1607 . . . .”101 The statute defines a “foreign
state” to be a “political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state.”102 Included in the statutory definition
of an “agency or instrumentality” is any entity “which is a separate legal
person, corporate or otherwise, and . . . which is an organ of a foreign
state or a political subdivision thereof . . . .”103

95

H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487. See also Permanent Mission of India v. New York, 551
U.S. 193, 199 (2007) (“In enacting the FSIA, Congress intended to codify the restrictive
theory’s limitation of immunity to sovereign acts.” (citations omitted)).
96
Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 38 (1978). Prior to the passage of the FSIA, “all of the important
trading and industrial countries of the Western world, with the sole exception of the
United Kingdom,” had adopted some form of the restrictive doctrine. Id. Moreover, the
restrictive doctrine had been incorporated in a number of important international
conventions. Id. For a list of international courts that adopted the restrictive theory prior
to the passage of the FSIA, see Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
702 n. 15 (1976) (citing to opinions from Austria, Belgium, Canada, England, Egypt,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Pakistan, Philippines and Yugoslavia.).
97
Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 610 (1992).
98
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493; 28 U.S.C.S. § 1330(a) (2006).
99
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989)
(“We think that the text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress’s intention that
the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.”).
See also Weltover, 504 U.S. at 610–11; Johnson v. U.K. Gov’t, 608 F. Supp. 2d 291, 295
(D. Conn. 2009); Cabiri v. Gov’t of Republic of Ghana, 165 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir.
1999).
100
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993).
101
28 U.S.C.S. § 1604 (emphasis added).
102
§ 1603(a) (emphasis added).
103
§ 1603(b).

400

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 6:385

Courts apply the FSIA in every action against a foreign
sovereign.104 Unless an exception applies,105 “federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state.”106 Determining
whether an entity, or individual, qualifies as a “foreign state,” and
further, whether an exception applies, is therefore crucial to the
sovereign immunity inquiry.107 In its practical application, the statute
“starts from a premise of immunity and then creates exceptions to the
general principle.”108 Scholars of human rights and international law
criticize that the theoretical hurdles such an approach builds into human
rights litigation has resulted in sovereign immunity becoming the rule
rather than the exception.109
III. THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER UNDER THE FSIA, FOREIGN
OFFICIALS SHOULD BE GRANTED IMMUNITY FOR ACTS TAKEN IN
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
There is a split in the circuits as to whether a “foreign official”
qualifies as a “foreign state” under the FSIA, and therefore enjoys the
same sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state when sued for acts taken
in official capacity.110 While the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and D.C.
104

Verlinden v. B.V. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (stating that the
FSIA “must be applied by the district courts in every action against a foreign sovereign,
since subject-matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one of the
specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.”)
105
§§ 1605–1607. See also Eric Engle, Frontiers In International Human Rights Law:
The Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims’ Protection Act: Jurisdictional
Foundations And Procedural Obstacles, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L & DISPUTE RES. 1, 44
(2006) (“[T]here are several exceptions which can be summarized as either based on (1)
waivers of immunity or (2) commercial acts.”)
106
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at
488–89).
107
See, e.g., Xuncax et. al. v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 175–76 (D. Mass. 1995)
(finding as a preliminary jurisidictional matter, no presumption of sovereign immunity,
no applicable FSIA exception, and therefore, no FSIA shield to suit against former
Guatemalan Minister of Defense).
108
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487, at 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6604,
6606–07.
109
See Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of
the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 756 (2003). Caplan’s
understanding is that state immunity is not a presumptive right under international law,
but derives from a “forum state’s concession of jurisdiction.” Id.
110
It is fairly clear that officials are not immune from suit when they have acted in an
unofficial capacity. See Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1107 (9th. Cir.
1990) (“[The official] would not be entitled to sovereign immunity for acts not
committed in his official capacity. . . . [I]f the officer purports to act as an individual and
not as an official, a suit directed against that action is not a suit against the sovereign.”);
Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(“Individuals acting in their official capacities are considered ‘agencies or
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Circuits have held that a foreign official should be granted immunity
under the FSIA for acts carried out in his official capacity, the Seventh
Circuit shattered precedent in holding the opposite.111 More recently, the
Fourth Circuit held that former officials were not immune from suit, but
current officials could avail themselves of the FSIA.112 While not siding
with any one circuit’s position per se, this note takes the view, reflected
in legislative history and case-law interpreting the statute, that Congress
never intended that the FSIA provide immunity to foreign sovereign
officials.113 As an alternative theory, this note posits that foreign
government officials are not immune in suits alleging violations of jus
cogens norms; the passage of the TVPA was an explicit private right of
action for victims and their survivors to sue perpetrators of torture, and
Congress did not intend the FSIA to be a barrier to such suits.
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit court to address this issue
when it held in Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank that the FSIA applied to
individual foreign officials sued in their official capacity.114 The
Chuidian court rejected the government’s suggestion of a bifurcated
approach that relegated to the State Department the decision of whether
to grant immunity to a foreign official while using the FSIA to determine
the immunity of the state itself.115 According to the Ninth Circuit, such
an approach would undermine the FSIA by promoting forum shopping,
especially in situations where immunity is unclear.116 The court pointed
out that although § 1603(b) does not explicitly use the term “individual”
in defining foreign instrumentalities, neither does it expressly exclude

instrumentalities of a foreign state;’ these same individuals . . . are not entitled to
immunity under the FSIA for acts that are not committed in an official capacity.”
(citations omitted)).
111
See infra notes 130 to 134.
112
See supra notes 26 to 28.
113
For a discussion of legislative history and case-law, see infra notes 227 to 235 and
243 to 255 respectively.
114
912 F.2d at 1103. In Chuidian, a Philippine citizen sued an official of the
Philippine government after the official instructed the Philippine National Bank to
dishonor a Bank-issued letter of credit. Id. at 1097. The official was sued for alleged
intentional interference with the plaintiff’s contractual relations with the Bank. Id.
115
Id. at 1099. The government’s position was that an official is not covered by the
Act because he is an individual rather than a corporation or an association. Id.
116
Id. at 1102. The court explained that litigants who “doubted the influence and
diplomatic ability of their sovereign adversary would choose to proceed against the
official, hoping to secure State Department support.” Id. However, litigants “less
favorably positioned would be inclined to proceed against the foreign state directly,
confronting the Act as interpreted by the courts without the influence of the State
Department.” Id.
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it.117 The court highlighted a lack of evidence of Congressional intent to
exclude individual foreign officials from the purview of the Act.118 To
the Chuidian court, this was particularly significant because Congress
intended to codify existing common law in the FSIA.119 To cement its
point, the court noted that a suit against an individual acting in his
official capacity is the practical equivalent of a suit against the sovereign
directly.120 The court concluded that allowing unrestricted suits against
individual foreign officials would amount to a “blanket abrogation of
foreign sovereign immunity by allowing litigants to accomplish
indirectly what the [FSIA] barred them from doing directly.”121
Six years later, in El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, citing
Chuidian for guidance on the theory that an individual can qualify as an
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” the District of Columbia
Circuit dismissed claims against the Deputy Governor of the Central
Bank of Jordan.122 The District of Columbia Circuit reaffirmed its
position a year later in dismissing claims against members of the Abu
Dhabi royal family for injuries to a United States citizen in a boating
accident.123 The Fifth Circuit followed suit in Byrd v. Corporacion
Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., holding that the FSIA extended
sovereign immunity to individuals acting within their official capacity as
officers of corporations that were considered foreign sovereigns.124 The
Fifth Circuit found that individual employees of a Honduran corporation
117

Id. at 1101 (“‘[A]gency,’ ‘instrumentality,’ ‘organ,’ ‘entity,’ and ‘legal person,’
while perhaps more readily connoting an organization or collective, do not in their typical
legal usage necessarily exclude individuals.”).
118
Id. (“Nowhere in the text or legislative history does Congress state that individuals
are not encompassed within the section 1603(b) definition . . . . [A]side from some
language which is more commonly associated with the collective, the legislative history
does not even hint of an intent to exclude individual officials from the scope of the
Act.”). But see Part IV infra, detailing legislative history that suggests the opposite.
119
Id. (“[P]re-1976 common law expressly extended immunity to individual officials
acting in their official capacity. If in fact the Act does not include such officials, the Act
contains a substantial unannounced departure from prior common law.”) (emphasis
added).
120
Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101; See Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG
2D, 13 (2009) for a similar view.
121
Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101.
122
75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The plaintiff alleged wrongful termination. Id. at
670. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the official was acting in an individual as
opposed to official capacity, but the court found no evidence of this, and dismissed
pursuant to the FSIA. Id. at 671.
123
Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir.
1997). The court found that the drivers of the boat had acted in their official capacity as
government officials. Id.
124
182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999).
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whose stock was almost entirely in the hands of a Honduran
governmental entity constituted a “foreign state” within the purview of
the FSIA.125 The Sixth Circuit tackled the issue in Keller v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, and citing Chuidian and El-Fadl, stated that “normally
foreign sovereign immunity extends to individuals acting in their official
capacities . . . .”126 In Kellar, a Michigan-based manufacturer sued
several Nigerian citizens, including a prince, and the Central Bank of
Nigeria.127 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit did not engage in a detailed
discussion of the question, instead deferring to plaintiff’s concession that
the defendant bank representatives enjoyed the same immunity as the
sovereign state.128
Against the weight of authority from the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and
District of Columbia circuits, the Seventh Circuit in Enaharo v.
Abubakar held that the FSIA did not apply to individuals. Plaintiffs in
Enaharo brought suit against former General Abdusalami Abubakar,
then a ranking member of the Provisional Ruling Council who in 1998
had assumed the head of state position in Nigeria in 1998.129 Abubakar
claimed immunity under the FSIA.130 The Seventh Circuit cautioned
against the Ninth Circuit’s approach to statutory construction in
Chuidian that the Fifth, Sixth and District of Columbia circuits had
subsequently adopted:
[The Chuidian court] looked at the statute and
concluded that its language – the terms agency,
instrumentality, organ, entity, and legal person –
while perhaps more readily connoting an organization
or collective, do not in their typical legal usage
necessarily exclude individuals. Because Congress
did not exclude individuals, the court concluded that
if the individual was acting in his official capacity, the
125

Id. at 388–89.
Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (2002).
127
Id. at 814–15. In Keller, plaintiff Keller had been approached by defendants, one
of whom claimed to be Nigerian royalty. Id. at 814. Defendants wanted exclusive
distribution rights to Keller’s medical care facilities in Nigeria, and promised $25 million
in funding. Id. However, after Keller expended $25,000 of his own funds, he realized he
was the victim of a scam. Id. Plaintiff asserted various claims, including RICO violations,
common law fraud, and intentional misrepresentation. Id. at 814. The district court
concluded that the defendants were not immune under the FSIA because the transaction
fell within the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Id. at 815.
128
Id. at 815.
129
Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 908 (7th Cir. 2005). The complaint consisted
of seven claims – torture, arbitrary detention, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,
false imprisonment, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
wrongful death. Id. at 880.
130
Id. at 910.
126
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FSIA was applicable. We are troubled by this
approach – that is, by saying Congress did not
exclude individuals; therefore they are included. Not
only does it seem upside down as a matter of logic,
but it ignores the traditional burden of proof on
immunity issues under the FSIA.131

Noting that the FSIA defines “agency and instrumentality” as a
“separate legal person,” a phrase that “refers to a legal fiction – a
business entity which is a legal person,” the Seventh Circuit concluded
that the FSIA did not provide immunity to individual foreign officials.132
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit granted Abubakar immunity for acts
committed while acting as the head of state of Nigeria, but denied
immunity for acts committed in his capacity as a general and a member
of the Nigeria’s Provisional Ruling Council.133
Three years after Abubakar, in litigation related to the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Second Circuit rejected the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation and sided with the majority of other circuits.134 In
that case, survivors of the terrorist attacks along with insurers and
property owners sued hundreds of parties, including four Saudi Arabian
princes.135 Largely relying on Chuidian, the Second Circuit emphasized
that “agency” in the FSIA “has a more abstract common meaning than a
governmental bureau or office: an agency is any thing or person through
which action is accomplished.”136 The Second Circuit opined that the
term “agency” is broad enough “to include senior members of a foreign
state’s government and secretariat.”137 The Second Circuit therefore
found that the FSIA provided immunity to the four Saudi Arabian
princes.138 In Velasco, the Fourth Circuit did not engage in a detailed
discussion, but rather, deferred to the other circuits’ construction of the
FSIA to extend sovereign immunity to individuals acting in their official
capacity on behalf of a foreign state.139 In Samantar, the Fourth Circuit

131

Id. at 882.
Id. at 881–82.
133
Id. at 882.
134
In Re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2008).
135
Id. at 75. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants played a critical role in the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks because they funded Muslim charities that in turn
funded al Qaeda. Id. at 76.
136
Id. at 83.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 80.
139
Velasco v. Gov’t of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 399 (4th Cir. 2004).
132
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held that the FSIA does not protect a former official from suit for official
acts.140
In order for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split, it must
determine the proper relationship between the Alien Tort Claims Act, the
Torture Victim Protection Act, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act. That in turn will determine the possibility of redress for victims of
torture who wish to bring suit. Part III, immediately following, discusses
the history behind the ATCA, the TVPA, and the FSIA and explains how
the three statutes function with respect to each other. Part IV prescribes
a course of action for the Supreme Court and gives reasons why the
FSIA should not operate as a jurisdictional hurdle to suit under the
TVPA.
IV. TORTURE AND IMMUNITY: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TVPA
AND THE FSIA
The law surrounding torture, and more broadly, the violation of jus
cogens norms, developed separately from sovereign immunity law.141
The sovereign immunity concept and the laws surrounding it had a
unique evolution involving a combination of commercial and diplomatic
concerns.142 Jus cogens norms, on the other hand, “evolved out of the
recognition that certain values or interests are common to and affect the
international community as a whole, and that the violation of these
values of interests threatens peace, security, and world order.”143 Jus
cogens norms, by their very nature, are superior, and cannot be changed
or derogated from.144 Importantly, jus cogens norms have independent
validity and status and are untouched by the consent and practice of
states.145 Despite debate on which norms can be considered to have
reached this high standard, the prohibition of torture has been recognized
to constitute a jus cogens norm.146 However, because jus cogens norms
like the prohibition of torture developed without specific reference to
state immunity, the relationship between the prohibition of torture and
140

Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 383 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W.
3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08–1555).
141
Lorna McGregor, Addressing the Relationship Between State Immunity and Jus
Cogens Norms: A Comparative Assessment, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS CRIMES 69, 69 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al. eds., Springer 2007).
142
See supra Parts I and II.
143
Id. at 70 (internal citations omitted).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 71 (citing to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its FiftyThird Session, UN GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001)).
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state immunity remains unclear.147 This is undoubtedly the case in the
United States, where the Supreme Court will assess the relationship
between the Torture Victims Protection Act and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act in Samantar.
A. The TVPA Makes it Possible to Hold Torturers Civilly Liable When
Criminal Liability is Unavailable
Yousuf, the plaintiff in Samantar, hopes his suit “sends a message
that perpetrators of human rights [abuses] will be held accountable for
their crimes.”148 Models of accountability for human rights violations
like torture take on various forms—international criminal suits, domestic
and civil. It is preferable to hold abusers criminally liable in national or
international courts because punishment often includes a combination of
fines and lifetime imprisonment and, in some cases, death.149 However,
in many instances, such forms of criminal accountability are unavailable
because of gaps in current federal law.150 For example, the torture
statute,151 which provides for criminal prosecution of any person who
commits torture outside of the U.S. as long as the perpetrator is within
147
McGregor, supra note 142, at 71. The author addresses the inconsistency in the
treatment of sovereign immunity and jus cogens norms by comparing monist states with
dualist states. In monist states like Italy and Greece, state immunity and jus cogens
norms, as rules of international law, are directly incorporated into domestic law through
constitutional provisions. Id. at 72. Therefore, because immunity and jus cogens are two
rules of international law, the courts in monist states have denied immunity in jus cogens
cases due to their preemptory status under international law. Id. On the other hand, in
dualist states such as the United States, international law is not directly incorporated into
domestic law. Id. at 78. Because the United States has legislation on immunity (that is,
the FSIA), the courts have found immunity in cases concerning jus cogens. Id.
148
Branigin, supra note 5.
149
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994) (“Whoever outside the United States commits
or attempts to commit torture shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both, and if death results to any person . . . shall be punished by death or imprisoned for
any term of years or for life.”).
150
See Testimony of Pamela Merchant, Executive Director, The Center for Justice
and Accountability, Before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law Committee
on the Judiciary United States Senate, “From Nuremberg to Darfur: Accountability for
Crimes Against Humanity,” June 24, 2008 [hereinafter Pamela Merchant Testimony].
Even Congress has recognized that the United States lacks criminal jurisdiction to
prosecute the majority of acts that constitute “crimes against humanity,” and only held
Congressional hearings on such crimes as recently as November 2007. See Congressional
Panel – No Safe Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violators in the United States,
Part II – Statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division
United States Department of Justice before the United States Senate Committee On the
Judiciary Subcommitee on Human Rights and the Law. The subcommittee explored gaps
in U.S. federal law that prevent criminal prosecution of human rights abusers who have
sought safe haven in the United States.
151
18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994).
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U.S. jurisdiction, is triggered only when the torture was committed after
the date the statute was enacted, April 30, 1994.152 Defendants have also
escaped criminal liability under the Genocide Accountability Act of
2007.153 The war crimes statute also has limited applicability because it
only provides for prosecution of those who commit war crimes as long as
the victim or the perpetrator is a member of the U.S. armed forces or is a
U.S. national.154 Consequently, many of the most egregious human
rights abusers escape criminal prosecution, finding a safe-haven in the
United States.155 Currently, there are approximately 1,000 open cases
involving suspected perpetrators of serious human rights abuses from
approximately ninety-five countries who are living in the United
States.156
In many situations, holding those who have abused human rights
civilly liable for their actions might be the only legal avenue available to
victims. While civil actions do not have the advantage of keeping human
rights abusers “off the streets” through lifelong imprisonment or death
sentences, there are important benefits to be gained from civil redress,157
including depletion of terrorist and torturer organization assets to prevent
future acts.158 In addition, combining various federal civil statutes
152
Pamela Merchant Testimony, supra note 151. (“To our knowledge, since World
War II, the federal government has brought only one criminal human rights case against a
human rights abuser who has sought safe haven [in the United States]. . . . In December
2006, Chuckie Taylor, Charles Taylor’s son, was indicted under [18 U.S.C. §2340A] . . . .
[It] is the first and only case brought under the torture statute since it was enacted in
1994.)
153
18 U.S.C. § 1091.
154
18 U.S.C. § 2441.
155
See also Chitra Ragavan, A Safe Haven, but for whom? The U.S. Provides
Sanctuary For Many of the World’s Most Wanted, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
November 15, 1999. Congress has only recently addressed this problem. In late 2009, the
Senate and House passed the Human Rights Enforcement Act, which would combine the
two offices in the Justice Department with jurisdiction over human rights violations to
create a consolidated department focused on prosecution and denaturalization of human
rights abusers. See Press Release: Durbin’s Human Rights Enforcement Act Passes
House, Sent to President for Signature, Dec. 16, 2009, available at
http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseld=320958 [Durbin Press Release](last
visited February 14, 2010).
156
Durbin Press Release, supra note 156.
157
See Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out To the International Community: Civil
Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 19 DUKE J.COMP. &
INT’L L. 307, 308 (2009) (“A new type of lawsuit has emerged in the United States, in
which victims . . . have pursued the perpetrators of terrorist acts and the organizations or
nations who have enabled and funded them . . . [p]ursuant to several U.S. statutes – the
Antiterrorism Act of 1991, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
the Torture Victim Protection Act, and the Alien Tort Claims Act – along with common
law tort claims, such as aiding and abetting liability. . . .”).
158
Id. at 308. See generally Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New
Front: Dismantling the International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups Through
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“maximizes the types of money damages and the range of defendants
that can be held civilly accountable, including terrorist groups, officials,
and other individuals, along with the foreign states, organizations, and
agencies that sponsor them.”159 In allowing courts to hear civil claims
against persons allegedly responsible for severe human rights abuses, the
ATCA and the TVPA provide avenues through which victims of torture
might seek justice.
B. The TVPA, Codified as a Note to the ATCA, Provides an Explicit
Cause of Action for Acts of Torture.
The ATCA grants jurisdiction for the adjudication of violations of
the law of nations, while the TVPA, codified as a note to the ATCA,
provides an explicit cause of action for acts of torture. Congress adopted
the ATCA in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary Act.160 There is scarce
legislative history on the passage of the ATCA.161 Legal historians have
posited various theories, some quite colorful, on the reasons for its
passage.162 The Supreme Court itself noted that modern commentators
have concentrated on the statute’s text because of the dearth of drafting
history.163 In pertinent part, the ATCA provides district courts with
“original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”164 A plain reading of the ATCA indicates that it is a
jurisdictional statute.165 The ATCA does not grant an independent
substantive cause of action, but provides jurisdiction in the United States

Federal Statutory and Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 679 (2005)
(detailing the cases decided under several U.S. statutes – the Antiterrorism Act of 1991,
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Torture Victim Protection
Act, and the Alien Tort Claims Act).
159
Strauss, supra note 158, at 308.
160
See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
161
Id. (referring to the ATCA as a “legal Lohengrin” because “no one seems to know
whence it came.”)
162
See Eric Engle, Frontiers In International Human Rights Law – The Alien Tort
Statute and the Torture Victims’ Protection Act: Jurisdictional Foundations And
Procedural Obstacles, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L & DISPUTE RES. 1, 6 (2006) (“[I]t is likely
that Congress may have had the fight against piracy or possibly prize jurisdiction in
mind. . . . [A]nother possibility is that it was enacted to demonstrate to foreign powers
that the new U.S. government was in fact committed to the rule of law.”); see generally
Eric Engle, Alvarez-Machain v. United States and Alvarez Machain v. Sosa: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Natural Law, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L & DISPUTE RES. 149
(2005), for an inquiry into the legislative roots of the ATCA in the writings of Coke and
Blackstone, as well as in parallel British legislation.
163
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004).
164
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.
165
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
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for the adjudication of torts in violation of the law of nations.166 The
ATCA provides jurisdiction over tort suits brought by aliens only.167
Though it does not permit U.S. citizens to sue, defendants may be of any
other citizenship.168
The ATCA remained relatively dormant for 209 years; in that time,
it was invoked in only twenty-two cases.169 Plaintiffs in Filartiga v.
Pena Irala, a landmark 1980 decision by the Second Circuit, successfully
used the ATCA.170 In Filartiga, a Paraguayan national, brought suit
against the Inspector General of Police of Asuncion, Paraguay, for the
torture and wrongful death of his son.171 In allowing plaintiffs to rely on
the ATCA, Filartiga rests on the fundamental principle of international
law that one has a right to be free from torture vis-à-vis one’s own
government.172 Since Filartiga, human rights lawyers have built an
“impressive body of human rights jurisprudence” in ATCA cases.173 The
ATCA has become an important instrument for bringing claims of
human rights abuse before United States courts.174
The Supreme Court recently affirmed the validity of using the
ATCA, stating that ATCA claims must “rest on a norm of international
166

Eric Engle, The Torture Victims’ Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act, and
Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, 67 ALB. L. REV. 501, 501 (2003).
167
See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 887 (7th Cir. 2005).
168
Engle, supra note 163, at 501.
169
For a list of the twenty-two cases, see Karen Lin, Note, An Unintended Double
Standard of Liability: The Effect of the Westfall Act on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1718, 1757 n.109 (2008).
170
Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876. In Filartiga, plaintiff sued former Inspector General of
Police of Asuncion, Paraguay, who was present in the United States, but not a citizen. Id.
at 879. The court held that torture was a violation of the law of nations and could be used
as a valid basis of an ATCA claim. Id. at 884. The court found that although torture may
not have been against the law of nations at the time the ATCA became law, international
law had since evolved to include it. Id. at 881.
171
Id. at 879.
172
Id. at 883–85.
173
For a list of cases in which perpetrators of human rights abuses have been
successfully held accountable, see Sandra Coliver, et al., Holding Human Rights
Violators Accountable By Using International Law In U.S. Courts, Advocacy Efforts, and
Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 170 n.8 (2005). However,
commentators have also criticized an expansive reading of the ATCA. See Adam Liptak,
Class-Action Firms Extend Reach to Global Rights Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2007, at
A33 (“Business groups and the State Department have urged the courts to interpret the
law narrowly, saying that allowing such suits is a form of judicial imperialism that can
interfere with American foreign policy.”).
174
See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 887 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting) (“[Filartiga] and its progeny made ATCA human rights suits a familiar
feature of the federal judicial landscape . . . .”). See also Thomas H. Lee, The SafeConduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 832–33 (2006)
(describing ATCA as an “iconic vehicle for international human rights litigation in U.S.
federal courts.”)
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character accepted by the civilized world.”175 Sosa held that the ATCA
is a jurisdictional statute that creates no new causes of action, but that the
grant of jurisdiction was “enacted on the understanding that the common
law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability.”176
The Supreme Court left several issues unresolved, including,
importantly, whether applicable immunities exist.177 Although the courts
have followed Filartiga’s lead with little judicial dissent in finding that
the ATCA provides subject matter jurisdiction for violations of human
rights and international law, courts disagree on which violations of
international law are actionable under the statute.178 Codified as a note to
the ATCA, the TVPA was an attempt to clarify which types of claims
could be brought under the ATCA by providing an explicit cause of
action to U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike for extrajudicial killing and
torture.179 Congress adopted the TVPA in 1991, and President George

175

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 725. See Andrew B. Mohraz, Note, The
Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004) on the
Alien Tort Statute, 12 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 363, 363 (2006) (noting that the Court
affirmed the use of the ATCA in human rights cases in Sosa, despite the Court’s holding
that the statute did not permit the plaintiff to recover under the circumstances.).
176
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 700.
177
Coliver, supra note 174, at 171. Other issues left unresolved are “which ‘law of
nations’ violations can be remedied under the ATCA and exhaustion of remedies, forum
non conveniens, . . . the application of the political question and act of state doctrines,
and the choice of law – international, federal, state, or the law of the forum where the tort
occurred – to be applied to ancillary issues such as third party complicity (e.g., aiding and
abetting liability), capacity to sue and the measure of damages.” Id.
178
See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir.
2005) (holding that plaintiffs can raise separate claims for state-sponsored torture under
the ATCA and also under the TVPA); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1144–45
(E.D. Cal 2004) (recognizing claim for extrajudicial killing and torture under both the
ATCA and the TVPA); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164,
1179 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (recognizing claims for torture and extrajudicial killing under the
ATCA). But see Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 885 (7th Cir. 2005) (construing Sosa to limit relief
against torture and extrajudicial killing to the TVPA and dismissing plaintiffs’ torture
claim brought solely under the ATCA). See also Hugh King, Sosa v Alvarez-Machain
and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 1, 5–10 (2006)
(detailing various cases and divergent standards).
179
The statute, § 3(b)(1) defines torture to include: Any act, directed against an
individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering
(other than pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in,
or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person
information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that
individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind . . . .”
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H.W. Bush signed it into law in 1992.180 The TVPA establishes “an
unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action that has been
successfully maintained under an existing law, [the ATCA]. . . .”181
Legislative history182 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa183
indicate that the TVPA did not replace the ATCA, but rather, reinforced
it. In the TVPA, Congress prescribed a “new cause of action accessible
to American victims of brutality abroad,” thereby seeking to augment
and expand the reach of the ATCA.184 The Court in Sosa reaffirmed this
position; while cautioning courts to narrowly construe the set of
international norms used for claims under the ATCA, the Court found a
“clear mandate” for the same in the TVPA.185
The TVPA’s passage as an extension to the ATCA confirmed
congressional approval of the Filartiga line of human rights cases that
stemmed from the ATCA.186 Both the House and Senate Judiciary
committees pointed out that the TVPA was not meant to supplant the
ATCA, but that the ATCA was meant to remain “intact.”187 This general
intention is reflected in the fact that Congress enacted the TVPA without
amending or repealing any portion of the ATCA.188 However, the
TVPA, limiting its scope to extrajudicial killing and torture, is narrower
than the ATCA, which courts have interpreted to apply to genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, slavery, disappearances, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and prolonged arbitrary

180

28 U.S.C. § 1350 and note.
H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
182
S. REP. NO. 102–249, at 4–5 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 3–4 (1991).
183
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004).
184
Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 887 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
185
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
186
Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 887 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). As Judge Cudahy notes, the
House Report specifically refers to the concerns regarding human rights cases raised by
Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Id.
at 888.
187
S. REP. NO. 102–249, at 4–5 (“Section 1350 has other important uses and should
not be replaced . . . . Claims based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the
list of actions that may appropriately be covered by section 1350. Consequently, that
statute should remain intact.”); H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 4 (“[C]laims based on torture
and summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be
covered [under the ATCA] . . . [and therefore] that statute should remain intact to permit
suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of
customary international law.”)
188
See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 886–87 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plain text and
the legislative history of the TVPA indicate that it was meant to expand, not restrict, the
remedies available under the ATCA. The text of the TVPA itself contains no implicit or
explicit repeal of the ATCA, nor does it indicate a Congressional intent to limit or
supercede [sic] the ATCA in any way.”).
181
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detention.189 In addition, the TVPA is narrower than the ATCA in that it
can only be used against “individuals” who act under the “actual or
apparent authority . . . of any foreign nation.”190 However, it is broader
than the ATCA in one respect: it provides a remedy to U.S. citizens for
torture and summary execution that occurs under the color of foreign
law, while only foreign nationals may use the ATCA.191 Victims have
successfully used the ATCA and the TVPA to sue perpetrators of human
rights abuse including, but not limited to, torture. 192 Together, the
ATCA and the TVPA promote the protection of human rights
internationally—the ATCA by granting aliens access to federal courts to
redress torts committed in violation of the law of nations, and the TVPA
by granting relief for victims of torture.
C. The FSIA is a Gatekeeper in ATCA and TVPA Suits Against Foreign
Officials
The FSIA serves as a jurisdictional gatekeeper in suits against
foreign states and foreign officials. To prove a claim of torture under
either the ATCA or the TVPA, each plaintiff must first establish that
governmental actors carried out the alleged torture to which they were
subjected.193 If sued in a U.S. court, federal or state, a defendant foreign
official would invoke the FSIA in an attempt to show that the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit against him.194 The burden of

189
See, e.g., Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (extrajudicial
killing, crimes against humanity); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 373
F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (war crimes).
190
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)(1)–(2).
191
H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 4; S. REP. NO. 102–249, at 5. As the Second Circuit
noted, whereas the ATCA speaks only in terms of jurisdiction, the TVPA goes one step
further to create liability for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing under U.S. law. See
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 104–5 (2d Cir. 2000).
192
See generally, Coliver, supra note 174, at 173 (“Since 1980, at least sixteen human
rights perpetrators (including Pena-Irala, the defendant in the landmark Filartiga case)
have been sued successfully. One of those was a current high-ranking government
official: the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. Seven were former high-ranking
civilian or military officials who continued to exercise considerable influence in their
countries.”).
193
See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a) (“An individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall .
. . be liable . . . .”; H.R. REP. NO. 102–367 (noting that suits against purely private groups
are not actionable under the TVPA, and that plaintiffs must establish some governmental
involvement in the torture in order to bring a claim under the TVPA).
194
See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding as a
preliminary jurisdictional matter, no presumption of sovereign immunity, no applicable
FSIA exception, and therefore, FSIA did not provide a shield to suit against former
Guatemalan Minister of Defense).

2010]

SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY

413

proving the applicability of the FSIA shifts between litigants.195 For
example, when sued under the TVPA, the party seeking immunity from
suit must make a prima facie showing that it qualifies as a “foreign state”
as per the FSIA’s definition in § 1603.196 The burden of production then
shifts to the non-movant to establish that the FSIA does not apply, either
by showing that the entity is not a “foreign state,” or that one of the listed
exceptions to immunity apply.197 The burden finally shifts back to the
party claiming immunity, since that party bears the “ultimate burden of
proving immunity.”198 If successful, the official cannot be sued, and the
FSIA has operated as a jurisdictional gatekeeper in the action brought
under the ATCA or TVPA against the foreign official.
In Amerada Hess, the Supreme Court held that the FSIA provides
the exclusive basis for jurisdiction and that an exception to the general
rule of immunity had to fall within the enumerated exceptions under the
FSIA.199 This approach has been adopted by several circuit courts in
their reluctance to carve out exceptions to sovereign immunity not
specifically enumerated in the FSIA.200 However, for the most part,
perpetrators “were found to have had substantial responsibility for
egregious human rights violations, [were] subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the court, and [were] not entitled to immunity from suit
(sovereign, diplomatic, or otherwise)” and “plaintiffs satisfied the
requirements of standing and the statute of limitations, and demonstrated
that they had exhausted any available and effective remedies in their

195

Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005).
Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882. See also Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811,
815 (6th Cir. 2002).
197
Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882. The litigant could also show that the actions fall under
the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(2006), that amended the FSIA to permit claims against states which the United States
considers sponsors of terrorism. See also Keller, 277 F.3d at 815.
198
Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882. See also Keller, 277 F.3d at 815 (“[T]he party claiming
FSIA immunity retains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout.”).
199
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
200
See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 718–19 (9th Cir.
1992); Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that although “it is
doubtful that any state has ever violated jus cogens norms on a scale rivaling that of the
Third Reich,” even violations of that magnitude do not create an exception to the FSIA
where Congress has created none); Smith v. Libya, 101 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1996)
(noting that, although Congress had not done so for Libya’s role in the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103, “Congress may choose to remove the defense of sovereign immunity
selectively for particular violations of jus cogens, as it has recently done in the 1996
amendment of the FSIA.”); Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“It
is not necessary for this Court to reach the issue of whether the acts alleged by Plaintiffs
constitute violations of jus cogens norms because the FSIA contains no unenumerated
exception for violations of jus cogens norms.”).
196
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home countries.”201 Furthermore, “[i]n several cases the courts expressly
found that the cases did not pose a significant interference to U.S. foreign
policy or that the act of state doctrine applied.”202
The decision of the Court is Samantar is crucial because it will
redefine the ability of torture victims and their survivors to seek civil
redress in U.S. courts. In Samantar, the Supreme Court will answer two
questions. First the Court will address whether a foreign state’s immunity
from suit under the FSIA extends to an individual acting in his official
capacity on behalf of the state.203 Second, the Court will decide whether
an individual who is no longer an official at the time suit is filed retains
immunity from acts taken in his former capacity as an official acting on
behalf of the state.204 The Supreme Court’s decision will have a
profound impact on the ability of torture victims and their survivors to
bring suit under the ATCA and TVPA against current or former foreign
officials for violations of jus cogens norms and in particular, for acts of
torture.
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT THE FSIA DOES NOT
PROVIDE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO INDIVIDUAL FOREIGN OFFICIALS
FOR ACTS OF TORTURE
A. Foreign Officials Should not be Permitted to use the Guise of Foreign
Sovereign Immunity to Escape Liability for Torture, a Violation of a Jus
Cogens Norm
When the official acts of current or former individual foreign
officials violate jus cogens norms, immunity granted to foreign states in
the FSIA does not extend to current or former individual foreign
officials. Under the normative hierarchy theory, the state’s violation of
human rights protections that are considered preemptory jus cogens
norms abrogates the state’s jurisdictional immunity.205 A jus cogens
201

Coliver, supra note 174, at 174–75. In addition, “the plaintiffs satisfied the
requirements of standing and the statute of limitations, and demonstrated that they had
exhausted any available and effective remedies in their home countries.” Id.
202
Coliver, supra note 174, at 174. See, e.g., Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir.
2006), Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005), Jean v. Dorelien,
431 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 2005), Abebe–Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996),
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 173–74 (D. Mass. 1995), Chavez v. Carranza, 413
F. Supp. 2d 891 (D. Tenn. 2005).
203
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 08–1555 (June 18, 2009).
204
Id.
205
For an exhaustive discussion of normative hierarchy theory, see Lee M. Caplan,
State Immunity, Human Rights, And Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy
Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741 (2003). Caplan summarizes that the theory “postulates
that because state immunity is not jus cogens, it ranks lower in the hierarchy of
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norm is “a peremptory norm of general international law . . . accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.”206 The major features of jus cogens norms are the egregious
nature of their violation, and their indelibility207 Jus cogens norms
reflect the commitment of the international community to preventing
human rights abuses.208 As scholars have pointed out, states do not have
the freedom to decide not to abide by jus cogens norms.209
However, there remains uncertainty regarding which norms fit the
jus cogens category,210 and scholars and jurists have disagreed regarding
the precise source of jus cogens norms.211 It is suggested that they derive
from sources as diverse as international custom, express treaties, natural
law, or a combination of such factors.212 It is a disagreement as to
whether jus cogens norms are doctrinally derived or free-standing. Each
view has its own failures. For example, it might be troubling to suggest
that jus cogens norms arise out of customary international law because
such law normally may be altered by contrary practice or consistent
objection, thus defying the long-understood conception of jus cogens
norms as being binding and non-derogable.213 In fact, as the Ninth
Circuit has pointed out, customary international law and jus cogens
norms are related, but separate concepts:
Customary international law, like international law
defined by treaties and other international agreements,
international law norms, and therefore can be overcome when a jus cogens norm is at
stake.” Id. In this way, the normative hierarchy theory “seeks to remove one of the most
formidable obstacles in the path of human rights victims seeking legal redress.” Id.
206
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
207
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 491 (6th ed. 2003).
208
Id. at 488–90.
209
Christopher Ford, Adjudicating jus cogens, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 145, 146–47 (1994)
(citations omitted) (“Traditional sovereign-consent theories of international obligation do
not apply to peremptory norms: while states retain the freedom to ‘contract out’ of other
international rules (jus dispositivum) or to maintain the status of a persistent objector
unbound by customary law, states appear to have no freedom to adopt ‘an attitude apart’
with respect to jus cogens.).
210
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 n.6 (1987) (“[A]lthough the concept of jus cogens is now accepted, its
content is not agreed.”) See also BROWNLIE, supra note 208, at 516–17 (“more authority
exists for the category of jus cogens than exists for its particular content. . . .”)
211
See id. at 146–51 (discussing the introduction of jus cogens norms and
acknowledging the highly
contested claim that they are free-standing and independent of custom).
212
Ford, supra note 209, at 150.
213
Id. at 152.
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rests on the consent of states. A state that persistently
objects to a norm of customary international law that
other states accept is not bound by that norm . . . . In
contrast, jus cogens embraces customary laws
considered binding on all nations and is derived from
values taken to be fundamental by the international
community, rather than from the fortuitous or selfinterested choices of nations. Whereas customary
international law derives solely from the consent of
states, the fundamental and universal norms
constituting jus cogens transcend such consent . . . .214

Therefore, while the concepts of customary international law and
jus cogens norms might share some qualities, they are in fact two
different concepts, and it is hard to see how one is derived from the
other. Likewise, while a multinational treaty might be evidence of the
existence of a jus cogens norm, and an affirmation of its status as such,
the treaty itself may not be the source of the norm.215 The disagreement
over the source of jus cogens norms has therefore led commentators to
suggest that preemptory norms are “creatures without definable legal
pedigree or doctrinal standing” that ultimately derive from the
conscience of the international community.216 Despite disagreement
regarding the source of a particular jus cogens norm, the establishment
that something is a jus cogens norm informs the type of conduct that is
presumptively illegal under international law.
Violations of jus cogens norms are particularly egregious. Torture,
described as “a cruel assault upon the defenseless,”217 is one of the most
proscribed practices in international law. Its general aim is to “destroy a
human being, destroy his personality, identity, . . . [and] soul.”218
Although there are inconsistencies in the definition of what constitutes
torture in both international and national treaties, torture is universally
abhorred, and is regarded as a jus cogens norm of international human
rights law.219 Torture can lead to individual responsibility under
customary international law to the extent that all states have the ability to
214
See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)
(emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). See also BROWNLIE, supra note 208, at 5–7
(explaining the foundations of customary international law).
215
Ford, supra note 210, at 152.
216
Id.
217
Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 125 (1978).
218
Bent Sorensen & Inge Kemp Genefke, Medical Aspects of Torture, in THE
INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TORTURE 11, 12 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1991).
219
Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 714–18. See Julianne Harper, Note, Defining
Torture: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893,
894 (2009).
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punish acts of torture committed anywhere. Recent scholarship has
suggested that the almost universal acceptance of the United Nations
Torture Convention,220 coupled with the jus cogens nature and nonderogability of the ban on torture, leads to the conclusion that
international law recognizes torture as a freestanding international
crime.221 This view was confirmed by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which stated that the prohibition of
torture “is designed to produce a deterrent effect . . . that signals to all
members of the international community and the individuals over whom
they wield authority that the prohibition of torture is an absolute value
from which nobody must deviate.”222
Therefore, government officials should never be immune for acts of
torture because torture is never within the scope of a government
official’s authority as sanctioned by the state. A foreign state may not
provide immunity by authorizing an act that violates peremptory norms
of international law.223 The Senate Report made this clear by quoting a
letter sent by the State Department during the ratification process for the
Convention Against Torture, which affirmed that that the U.S.
Government “does not regard authorized sanctions that unquestionably
violate international law as ‘lawful sanctions’ exempt from the
prohibition on torture.”224 Furthermore, in enacting the TVPA, Congress
specifically referred to the obligation under the Torture Convention to
provide victims of torture access to remedies. Despite these statements,
the FSIA is at risk of being interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Samantar to provide immunity to foreign officials accused of torture and
sued in the United States under the TVPA.
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B. If the Supreme Court Holds That the Immunity Granted to Foreign
States in the FSIA Extends to Foreign Officials, it Would be Stripping
Torture Victims and their Survivors of a Congressionally Granted
Express Right of Action
In resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court should hold that the
FSIA does not provide blanket immunity for all acts of a foreign official.
Rather, when a current or former foreign official violates a jus cogens
norm, like torture, he must be held accountable even if it was an official
act, carried out under the state’s mandate. The Supreme Court should
interpret the TVPA and the FSIA together to strip away the immunity of
current or former foreign officials who have engaged in acts of torture in
their official capacity. Where Congress has created an express private
right of action for victims of a violation of a jus cogens norm, the
Supreme Court should not take away that right. Such a reading would
follow congressional intent; Congress passed the ATCA and,
importantly, the TVPA, giving a private right of action to torture victims.
A foreign state may not provide immunity by authorizing an act that
violates peremptory norms of international law.
The Supreme Court should resolve the split in favor of the Seventh
Circuit’s general view that officials who acted in their official capacity
are not immune from suit. Specifically in response to the two questions
on cert, the Court could broadly hold that a foreign state’s immunity
from suit under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, does not extend to an
individual acting in his official capacity on behalf of a foreign state; and
an individual who is no longer an official at the time suit is filed does not
retain immunity for acts taken in the individual’s former capacity as an
official acting on behalf of the foreign state. However, to light the path
towards accountability for foreign officials’ human rights violations, the
Court does not have to adopt an expansive holding; it can limit the
unavailability of the FSIA to violations of jus cogens norms. And, at the
narrowest, the court can hold that the TVPA is in itself an exception to
the FSIA, thus foreclosing the possibility of foreign sovereign immunity
in torture suits against foreign sovereign officials.
C. When Congress Passed the ATCA and TVPA, Congress Intended that
Former and Current Foreign Officials Would not be Immune From Suit
for acts of Torture
In the TVPA, Congress provided torture survivors with a private
right of action against individuals who had been responsible for their
torture. Congress codified landmark cases like Filartiga in the TVPA,
with the intent to provide relief to victims of torture, explicitly extending
the relief to U.S. citizens. As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Arce v.
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Garcia, absent a cause of action in United States courts, some of the
worst cases regarding human rights violations would go unheard and
unpunished because regimes that commit the most egregious human
rights abuses are often the ones that possess the least adequate legal
mechanisms for redress.225 Congress recognized this problem when it
enacted the TVPA:
Judicial protection against flagrant human rights
violations is often least effective in those countries
where such abuses are more prevalent. A state that
practices torture . . . is not one that adheres to the rule
of law. . . . [T]he . . .[TVPA] is designed to respond to
this situation by providing a civil cause of action in
U.S. courts for torture committed abroad.226

If the FSIA were to extend the immunity enjoyed by foreign states
to government officials, the intentions of Congress would be undermined
and contradicted. The stated purpose of the TVPA “is to provide a
Federal cause of action against any individual who, under actual or
apparent authority or under color of law of any foreign nation, subjects
any individual to torture or extrajudicial killing.”227 Thus, when
Congress passed the TVPA, it was with the understanding that immunity
under the FSIA would not apply to former officials sued under the
TVPA. Through the TVPA’s extension of a civil remedy to U.S. citizens
subjected to torture abroad, Congress wanted to enhance the remedy
already available under the ATCA.228 When Congress passed the TVPA,
it did so knowing that there existed traditional diplomatic immunities
afforded to foreign diplomats and heads of state codified in the FSIA.
The TVPA is not intended to “override traditional diplomatic immunities
which prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts over foreign
diplomats.”229 The Senate Report also notes that the TVPA would
“establish an unambiguous basis” for the cause of action in Filartiga and
“extend a civil remedy to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured
abroad.”230
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The House and Senate Reports dictate the specific intended
relationship between the FSIA and the TVPA, but an analysis of the
same reveal conflicting statements. The Senate Report states that “only
individuals may be sued,” and that consequently, “the TVPA is not
meant to override the FSIA of 1976.”231 The Senate Report also
pointedly clarifies Congress’s intent in using the term “individual” in the
TVPA “to make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be
sued under this bill under any circumstances.”232 Therefore, as the
Senate Report continues, “the TVPA is not meant to override the
[FSIA].” 233 Similarly, the House Report states that the TVPA is “subject
to the restrictions” in the FSIA.234 The House Report and the Senate
Report relating to the passage of the TVPA make it extremely clear that
Congress was aware of the complications and contradictions that would
arise with sovereign immunity under the FSIA on one hand, and a private
right of action under the TVPA on the other.
When Congress passed the FSIA in 1976, the statute did not state
that the immunity afforded to foreign states would be given to individual
officials of those foreign states. The statute only referred to foreign states
and their agents and instrumentalities.235 A plain reading of the statute
indicates that it does not apply to individuals. The Second Circuit in
Tachiona v. United States noted that with respect to § 1603(b),236
agencies and instrumentalities are defined “in terms not usually used to
describe natural persons.”237 The Seventh Circuit noted in Enaharo v.
Abubakar that if Congress wanted it to apply to foreign officials,
Congress would have said so in clear and unmistakable terms.238 The
codification of the Filartiga principle in the TVPA further evidences this
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intent: torture victims can seek justice in courts in the United States
against individuals who committed the crime.239
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dole Foods Co. v.
Patrickson stands for the proposition that the FSIA protects neither
former officials nor officials operating outside the scope of their lawful
authority.240 In Dole Foods Co. v. Patrickson the Supreme Court held
that in a suit against an entity that is potentially an agency or
instrumentality of the state, thus implicating the possible application of
FSIA immunity, the status of the entity is determined at the time of the
suit is filed, not at the time of the conduct giving rise to the suit.241
Therefore, although the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian and the Fourth Circuit
in Velasco held that the FSIA applies to officials acting within their
scope of authority in reasoning that the individuals can be considered
agencies and instrumentalities, the Court’s opinion in Dole mandates that
FSIA immunity would not extend to former officials.
D. A Long Line of Cases has Permitted Torture Survivors to Seek Justice
and Hold Former Officials Accountable in United States Courts in
Accordance with Congressional Intent in Passing the TVPA.
Several cases in recent years have permitted torture survivors to
seek civil redress against the foreign officials who have been perpetrators
of human rights abuses.242 Each case allowing aliens and U.S. citizens
alike to seek civil redress in federal court for wrongs committed in
violation of international law or United States treaties follows directly
from Chuidian’s and Filartiga’s precedent. In Xuncax v. Gramajo,
Guatemalan and U.S. citizens sued Hector Gramajo, a former
Guatemalan Minister of Defense under the TVPA.243 Citing Chuidian
for guidance, the court dismissed the applicability of the FSIA and stated
that Gramajo was not entitled to immunity for acts of torture, because
torture is beyond the scope of an official’s authority.244 Furthermore, the
239
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court went as far as to apply the TVPA retroactively to Gramajo, despite
the fact that the TVPA was not in effect at the time the atrocities against
the plaintiffs were committed.245
In Arce v. Garcia, an Eleventh Circuit case, Salvadorian refugees
successfully sued El Salvador’s former Minister of Defense Jose Garcia
and National Guard’s Director General Carlos Vides Casanova under the
TVPA, alleging that military personnel tortured them during a campaign
of human rights violations between 1979 and 1983.246 In yet another
case, Chavez v. Carranza, former and current citizens of El Salvador
sued Nicholas Carranza, former Subsecretary of Defense and Public
Security.247 Plaintiffs suffered egregious human rights abuses at the
hands of military personnel.248 Suing under the TVPA, plaintiffs claimed
that Carranza exercised command over his subordinates to commit acts
of torture, and to cover up those and other human rights abuses.249 The
court granted four out of five of the plaintiffs’ summary judgment
motions finding that the former Subsecretary committed the acts of
torture were committed as per his command responsibility.250
Similarly, in Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the judgment against Armando Fernandez-Larios, a former
Chilean military officer, alleged to have participated in the execution of
Chilean economist Winston Cabello.251 Cabello’s survivors alleged that
Fernandez participated in Cabello’s extra-judicial killing as part of
dictator General Augusto Pinochet’s Caravan of Death.252 The court
found a private right of action in the TVPA to sue the official, and held
that the TVPA was intended to reach beyond the person who actually
committed the acts, to those ordering, abetting, or assisting in the
violation.253 In Jean v. Dorelien, another Eleventh Circuit case, citizens
of Haiti, successfully brought TVPA claims of torture and extrajudicial
killing against Carl Dorelien, colonel in the Haitian Armed Forces, for
acts of torture and extrajudicial killing.254 Scholars have identified a
number of important objectives that these cases have accomplished.255
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These include ensuring that the United States does not remain a safe
haven for human rights abusers, while creating an atmosphere of
deterrence for future human rights abuses where individual perpetrators
are held responsible for their human rights crimes.256 Reaching these
goals have provided victims of human rights abuse with a sense of
official acknowledgement and reparation and inspired efforts in other
countries to set up procedures to prosecute human rights violations in
their own courts.257
VI. CONCLUSION
Yousuf v. Samantar presents the Supreme Court with a unique
opportunity to address important questions regarding the future of human
rights litigation in United States courts because it will do so against the
backdrop of centuries-old precedent on sovereign immunity juxtaposed
with evolving ideas on jus cogens norms. First, the Court will be in a
position to resolve the split in the circuits regarding whether former or
current officials qualify as agents or instrumentalities of the state.
Second, in addressing the reach of the TVPA, the Court will answer
whether the United States provides victims with enforceable remedies
against former officials of foreign governments responsible for torture.
Underlying both issues is the fact that Congress passed the TVPA in
1991 specifically to ensure that the United States would abide by its
international legal obligations under the Convention against Torture.
Violations of jus cogens norms such as the prohibition of torture are
particularly egregious. Foreign officials responsible for egregious
human rights abuses should be held accountable and should not be
permitted to hide under the guise of state immunity. When Congress
enacted the TVPA, it did so with the express intention of establishing
liability for torturers and thereby provided victims and their survivors
redress in United States courts. The FSIA should not serve as a hurdle to
such redress. Holding that the FSIA bars suit against individual foreign
officials sued under the TVPA would thwart the intentions of Congress.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should hold that current or former
individual foreign officials are not immune from suit for official actions
that violate jus cogens norms such as torture.
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